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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the procedural fairness rule with regard to 
unjustifiable dismissal, in order to determine wl}.ether this rule, 
which has the funtion of supplying employment security to workers, 
is also fair to employers. 
The paper reviews the history of "unjustifiable dismissal" in New 
Zealand Employment law, and then examines the content of procedural 
fairness, the relationship between procedural and substantive 
fairness and the reduction of remedies because of contributory fault. 
The conclusion is reached that the employer is constantly at a 
disadvantage. The subordination of procedural to substantive 
fairness, pedantic scrutiny of the courts, and the fact that the 
reduction of remedies because of contributory conduct does not 
adequately redress the imbalance, all combine to create a situation 
that is not fair to the employer. The consequence of this situation 
may well be that employers are discouraged from taking on additional 
staff. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14,000 words. 
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[ INTRODUCTION 
The trend in Employment Law in New Zealand has been to provide 
employees with increasing certainty in their employment.
1 One aspect 
of this trend is the treatment of unjustifiable dismissal which is 
by far the most frequent complaint in personal grievance actions.
2 
Although an employer is required to justify the dismissal of an 
employee both substantively and procedurally, it is now firmly 
established that procedural unfairness alone justifies a finding of 
unjust i able di smi ssa l. 3 It has been argued that the Employment 
Tribunal and the Employment Court do have "mechanisms" to deal with 
the situation where the facts may justify a dismissal but where the 
employer has acted unfairly. One "mechanism" i s to ensure that an 
employer is not burdened by excessive technicality in ensuring that 
procedural fairness is observed, and the other i s that an award may 
be reduced on the grounds of contributory conduct.
4 
This paper traces the hi story of the requirement of procedural 
fairness, examines the contents of th i s requirement as interpreted 
by case law, and analyses the way in wh i ch the Tribunal and the Court 
have dealt with contributory conduct. The purpose is to determine 
whether the "mechanisms" result in a fair deal fo r the employer or 
whether the subordination of substance to procedure is be i ng used as 
a basis for awarding liberal compensat i on5 to the employee even when 
there has been substantive just i fi cation for a di smi ssa l . 
6 
K Johnsto n "Pe r sonal Grieva nces: Remedies" (1995) Employment Law Bulletin 126. 
C Howard In terpre t a t ion of t he Emp l oyment Con t racts Ac t 1991 (NZ Business 
Roundtable/ NZ Employers Federation, December 1995) 18 . 
J Hug hes Persona) Grievances ( Butt erwor t hs, 1996) at 4.5. 
G Anderson, B Banks, J Hughes, K Johnston (eds) Employment Law Gu ide (2ed 
Bu t te r worths, Wellington, 1995) 319. 
St a t istics released by the Employme n t Court and Tribunal for 1995 s ho w th a t t he 
ma jori t y o f a war d s of compensation for "humila t ion" ranged between $ 20 0 0 a n d 
$8 000. 
Above n 2, 19 . 
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II PROTECTION AGAINST DISMISSAL: A CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE 
A Two Opposing Viewpoints 
Protection against unjustified dismissal is part of the wider concept 
of employment security, 7 and it remains a hotly debated issue in many 
countries. In the post-war period there has been the general idea 
that workers have a right to a reasonable degree of employment 
protection. 8 There are three main arguments in favour of employment 
protection. Firstly it is held that where employers can dismiss 
workers at wi 11 they wi 11 abuse this right or coerce workers into 
forgoing legal entitlements. Secondly workers have an investment, not 
only financial but also of intangible benefits in their jobs and 
should not be unjustifiably deprived of these. Thirdly it is argued 
that a particular job has more value to an employee than a particular 
employee has to the employer. This view is mainly opposed by the 
Chicago School of nee-classical economists who argue that an 
efficient labour market depends on employment at will. It is argued 
that an employer must be free to hire and fire to meet the productive 
requirements of the firm and to maximise its operating efficiency. 
It is also argued that an employer would not dismiss without good 
reason because of its investment of training and experience in the 
worker. 
B The Employment Protection Debate in New Zealand 
At the time when the Employment Contracts Act 1991 ("ECA") was passed 
it was decided to leave the personal grievance provisions largely 
unchanged. This decision was made in spite of strong arguments from 
within the Government and other quarters for its abolition.
9 The NZ 
Business Roundtable and NZ Employers' Federation proposed that unless 
parties had contracted to the contrary, all contracts of employment 
Above n 4, 197. 
Principle incorporated in lLO Convention 158 on the Termination of Employment at 
the Initiative of the Employer; see above n 4, 198 . 
Above n 4, 1 99 . 
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may be terminated on 14 days notice. 10 They argued that any increase 
in job security for some comes at the expense of reduced job security 
for others. By making firing unnecessarily difficult and costly, the 
costs of employing workers in the first place are increased, and this 
results in the reduction of overall employment. Employers will be 
unwilling to take on "unknown quantities", such as long-term 
unemployed workers, if it is difficult to terminate relationships 
that do not work out. While individual workers may gain as a result 
of the courts' pro-worker decisions, workers as a group and the 
unemployed will be the losers . 11 
The debate continues in New Zealand, for dismissal remains a 
contentious issue. Although the requirement of procedural fairness 
with regard to dismissal is firmly established in case law, there is 
still a considerable amount of dissatisfaction that cont i nues to be 
expressed. On the one hand there is the view that the courts do not 
go far enough in the favour of employees that the level of 
compensation does not recognise the real economic con sequences of 
dismissal . 12 On the other hand it is argued that it is unfa i r that 
employees retain the right to leave employment "without explanation 
or consideration of even the most minor of the employer 's interests , 
provided only that they give the agreed notice", 13 whereas an 
employer who terminates a working relationship has his attitude, 
behaviour and procedures minutely examined and c riticised. Ther e is 
also dissatisfaction with the assumpt i on (on wh ich job protection is 
based) that a particular job has greater value to an employee than 
a particular employee has to an employer , as if an employer who loses 
NZ Business Ro undt able, NZ Employers Federation A Study of t he Labour/ Employment 
Cour t (December 199 2 ) 46. 
NZ Bus i ness Roundtable Submission to th e Labour Select Committee on the Employment 
Con t rac t s B i ll (Febr u ary 1991) 12; see also R Kerr "Back to Basics on t h e Labour 
Mar k et" Pape r at H R Ni cholls Society ( Melbourne, 22 August 1995) 10; see also CW 
Bai rd The Empl oyment Contrac t s Act & Unjustifiable Dismissal (NZ Bus in ess 
Round t ab l e/ NZ Empl oyers Federation , Wel l ington, Au g u st 1996). 
J Hugh es " Perso na l Grievances" i n Employment Contracts: New Zea lan d Exp erien ces 
(Vic t oria Un ive r si t y Press , We ll i n gton , 1993) 107; see also G And erson " Th e 
Or igi n s and Devel opm en t of th e Personal Grievance Jurisdiction in New Zeala nd " 
(1988 ) N Z of I ndus t ria l Relat ions 269 . 
A J o nes " Employers Pay t h e Price of Absu rd Dismissal Demands" (1996) T h e National 
Bu si n ess Re vi ew 12. 
14 
15 
16 
5 
an employee can simply go and get another. This attitude, it is 
argued, ignores the fact that workers are not necessarily 
interchangeable to employers, and that losing a particular employee 
can be disabling to an employer. 14 In a recent publication 15 it is 
contended that the present unjustifiable dismissal doctrine not only 
discourages employers from taking on new employees because of the 
difficulties of firing without the costs and perils of litigation, 
but also adversely affects the productivity of already hired workers 
who know that their employers will not easily fire them because of 
the costs involved. 
It is interesting to note that as New Zealand prepares for the coming 
election, the various political parties have set out the main points 
of their industrial relations policies. ACT New Zealand supports the 
ECA and would like to strengthen it by simplifying the personal 
grievance procedures. This party believes that the existing 
provisions "make it too hard for employers to dismiss workers". 
United New Zealand also supports the ECA and would wish to review the 
grievance and dismissal provisions of the Act to make them simpler 
and more streamlined, removing some of the "existing impediments to 
dismissing employees 11 • 16 
III THE HISTORY OF UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSAL 
Prior to 1970 employees who thought that they had been unjustifiably 
dismissed had the option of either seeking support from their union 
or to resort to a common law action. At common law an employer had 
to either give a reasonable period of notice or the period of notice 
provided for in the contract of employment, or make a payment in lieu 
of notice. It was not, however, necessary for an employer to give a 
Above n 1 3, 1 2 . 
CW Baird, above n 11, 13-14, 
"How Work \'ii 11 Get Done", The Sunday Star-Times, New Zealand, 22 September 1996, 
04. 
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reason for the di smi ssa l . 17 The rule in Addis v Grammophone co18 
limited damages to the f i nancial loss caused by not giving the 
correct notice. 19 In practice the common law offered almost no 
protection to the average worker because of the short periods of 
notice provided for in most awards and the low level of possible 
damages. It is therefore not surpr i sing that prior to 1970 dismissals 
were a major cause of strikes in New Zealand. 20 
In 1970 the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act was 
passed which provided for a voluntary procedure to settle disputes 
over "wrongful dismissals" . The wording confined the procedure to 
dismissals that were unlawful at common law. Ther e was, at this 
stage, no intention on the part of the legislature to remove an 
employer's right to hi re and fire, but rath e r a concern over the 
increasing number of strikes attributed to dismissals. 21 Because the 
common law terminolgy of "wrongful dismissal" was adopted , the Act 
made little change to the status quo. Three years later the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 ("IRA") was passed whi c h provided that 
a procedure for the resolution of personal gr i evances had to be 
contained in all awards and agreements, and the term " unjustif i able 
dismissal" replaced that of "wrongful dismissal". A personal 
grievance was defined as "a grievan ce that a worker ma y have against 
his employer because of a c laim that he has been un j ustifiably 
dismissed, or that other ac tion by the employe r . .. affect s his 
employment to his disadvantage" . 22 
The origins of New Zealand ' s personal grievan ce p r ov i sions can be 
traced back to developments which took place dur i ng the 1960s, when 
G Anderson "Th e or i gins a nd deve l opme nt of the personal grievance jurisdiction in 
New Zeala nd" (1988) New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations 259. 
[1909 ) AC 488. 
Above n 4, 202 . 
J Hug hes Labour Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 1813 . 
Above n 17, 257-261. 
B Boo n " Procedura l Fairness and the Unjustified Dismissal Decision" ( 1992) 17 NZ 
J o urn al o f Indu s t rial Relations 302. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
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a need was felt for greater protection aga i nst unjust i fied 
termination of employment, echoing an international trend towards 
greater protection for workers. 23 In 1966 Mr R Green published a 
paper, Procedures to sett 7 e dj sputes over a 7 7 eged wrongfu 7 
djsmjssa724, in which he discussed the unenthusiastic response of 
employers and unions to the efforts of the then Minister of Labour 
to have a standard procedure to deal with alleged wrongful dismissals 
adopted . Employers were loath to lose their "right" to h i re and f i re 
at will and unionists feared, among other things, that compensation 
rather than reinstatement would become the norm. It was therefore 
on l y mu c h l ate r , w i t h t h e passage of s 11 7 of t h e IRA , t h at an 
effective personal grievance procedure was enacted . 
The procedure introduced by the IRA d i d not prov i de a remed y for all 
workers, as a great many workers were excluded. Only those workers 
who were uni on members and whose work was covered by an award or 
other agreement, were covered. 25 In addition, the personal grievance 
procedure did not provide for direct access to the Cou r t for an 
individual worker, as it was the worker's union's right to take a 
personal grievance action on his or her behalf. Worker s only had 
direct access to the Court where their union failed to act or act 
promptly. This was due to the overall policy of industrial relation s 
legislation which, although it may have conferred benefit s on 
individual workers, generally left enforcement to the wor ke r' s union 
or other agency . 26 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 ("LRA") e xtended the coverage of the 
pe r sonal grievance p r ocedure to all union members, i rrespec t i ve of 
whether they were bound by an award or agreement. The term " persona 1 
grievance" was extended to include di scri mi nation, sexual harassment 
and duress . The latter three terms were defined in detai 1 , but 
Above n 17, 260 . 
Industrial Relations Centre , Vi c toria University . 
Above n 17, 262. 
Above n 17, 263. 
27 
28 
29 
30 
8 
unjustifiable dismissal was not. 27 
In 1991 the ECA extended the right to bring a personal grievance 
action to all employers. Union membership ceased to be a requirement 
and every contract of employment (individual or collective) contained 
an effective procedure for the settling of any personal grievance. 
Each individual employee can now bring a grievance action. 
Since 1973 there have been relatively few amendments to the 
substantive law regarding personal grievances. Amendments have mainly 
affected matters such as remedies or new categories of grievance such 
as discrimin~tion, sexual harassment or duress. 28 
IV THE INTERPRETATION OF "UNJUSTIFIABLE" 
Unlike the United Kingdom where such matters were def i ned in detail, 
there have been no legislative guidelines as to what conduct 
justifies a dismissal and whether it is legit i mate to cons i der 
procedural aspects of the dismissals as well as the substantive i n 
reaching a decision. 29 It was therefore left to the courts to develop 
a body of law. 
In 1980 Chief Judge Horn of the Arbitration court, in Taranaki 
Amalgamated Society of Shop Assistants and Related Trades IUW v CC 
Ward Ltd 30 expressed his reluctance to "set down rigid rules by way 
of precedent" and s uggested that as "(t)he l egi slature has not seen 
fit to define unjusti f ied dismissal ... the court draws the i nfe r ence 
that each case must be considered individually taking into account 
all surrounding circumstances". Chief Judge Horn's i nference that 
because the legi s lature f ailed to def ine "unjus t i fiabl e di smissal", 
Sections 2 10-213. Se e a lso H Fu l t o n Empl oymen t La w: Per s o na l Grievances Se mi n ar 
by Auckl an d Di s t ric t La w Society ( Au c kland, 18 J ul y 19 96 ) 1. 
Abo v e n 4, 2 04 . 
See H Fu l t on, above n 27, 1. 
[1980) ACJ 12 4 . 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
9 
the Court should not set down any guidelines, was criticised. 31 It 
was felt that it was the task of the court to establish guiding 
principles precisely because the statutory wording was ambiguous. 32 
Likewise, in Auckland Local Authorities etc Officers IUW v Waitemata 
City Counci733 the Court said that it was "refraining (to a degree) 
from laying down too early too rigidly defined principles". 
The Court of Appeal did however confirm in Wellington Road Transport 
etc IUW (re Hepi) v Fletcher Construction Co LtJ4 that in a personal 
grievance claim the onus is on the emp l eyer to show that the 
dismissal is justified. 
It would not be unreasonable to point out that in the absence of 
clear definition in the Act and the reluctance on the part of the 
Court to set out guiding principles, an employer could at that stage 
hardly be expected to know what procedure would be considered 
adequate when dismissing an employee! 
Guidance as to the meaning of "unjustifiable" was at last laid down 
in the Court of Appeal decision in Auckland City Council v Henness)5 
in which a car-park attendant, contrary to work rules, left his booth 
and assaulted patrons who were riding their motor cycles at excess 
speed. Shortly afterwards, while he was on leave, he was sent a 
letter of dismissal. He was not given the opportunity to state his 
side of the story. 36 Somers J held: 
.. (i)n the context of s 117 we find the word unjustified should have its 
ordinary accepted meaning. Its integral feature is the word unjust - that is 
to say not in accordance with justice or fairness. A course of action is 
J Hughes "Emerging Procedural Requirements under section 117 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1981" (1981) Otago Law Review 163 . 
DL Mathieson "The Lawyer, Industrial Conflict and the Right to Fire" (1981) New 
Zealand Law Journal 218. 
[1980) ACJ 35. 
[1982) ACJ 663. 
[1982] ACJ 699; see also G Andsrson "Procsdural Fairness and Unjustified 
Dismissal" (1883) NZ Journal of Industrial Relations 1-10 . 
Above n 3, at 4.1.; see also above n 21, 303. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
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unjust ifiab l e when th a t which is done cannot be shown to be in accordance with 
justice or fairness. 
Since this decision a body of case law has developed on this subject. 
The Court in New Zealand now sees the standard of fairness as being 
its own opinion based on a range of factors. It did not adopt the 
United Kingdom's test of whether the employer acted as a reasonable 
emp l oyer 37 , and consequently the reasonableness of the employer is 
not the overriding test. Instead, the Court has placed a strong 
emphasis on a combination of natural justice and "good industrial 
relations practice 11 • 38 
V WHAT IS PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS? 
A failure to observe any of the requirements of procedural fairness 
will usually lead to a finding of unjustifiable dismissal. The 
overriding function of this rule is to promote employment security . 39 
The minimum requirements of procedural fairness were set out in NZ 
Food Processing Union v Unilever NZ Ltd 40 : 
a) notice t o the employee of the specific allegation of misconduct to which 
th e employer must answer and of the likely consequences if the allegation is 
established; 
b) an opportunity, wh i eh must be real as opposed to a nominal one , for the 
employee to attempt to refute the allegation or to explain or mitigate his or 
her conduct ; and 
c) an unbiased consideration of the employee's explanation in the sense that 
consideration must be free from predetermination and influenced by irrelevant 
consideration. 41 
These requirements are the principles of natural justice and may 
require adaptation to the specific circumstances of each individual 
case. Procedural fairness consists not only of compliance with the 
See VII D. 
Above n 17, 267. 
I K Adzoxornu "Procedural Justification of Dismissals" (1991) NZLJ 291 . 
[1990] 1 NZILR 35; see also n 4, 321 . 
Above n 39, 290 . 
42 
43 
44 
11 
principles of natural justice but also compliance with any procedure 
that may be expressly set out in the employment contract or, in the 
absence of the latter, a particular procedure which an employee might 
legitimately expect the employer to follow. 42 
Four e l ements43 can actua 11 y be identified in the concept of 
procedural fairness, and these consist of the three requirements of 
natural justice mentioned in NZ Food Processing etc IUOWv Unilever 
NZ Ltd above plus the requirement of warnings: 
a) Warnings. The employer must warn the employer of the 
misconduct (unless it is serious misconduct warranting summary 
dismissal) and implicit therein must be a request for an 
improvement in conduct and performance. The employee must also 
be advised, at the warning stage, that his/her job in on the 
line. 
b) Investigation. The employer must carry out a full 
investigation of all relevant facts before actually terminating 
the employee's employment, and the result of such an 
investigation should be communicated to the worker. 
c) Reasons for the dismissal must be given to the employee 
before the dismissal is effected. 
d) Opportunity to be heard. The worker must be provided with 
a real opportunity to be heard and to offer an explanation to 
the alleged misconduct, before dismissal is affected. 44 
A Warnings 
Warnings are not part of the hearing itself but are included in 
procedural fairness. Warnings should be given to alert the employee 
to the possibility of dismissal. The only exception is where summary 
dismissal is justified. In 1981 in Otago Meatworkers Union v NZ 
Above n 3, at 4 . 8. 
JRP Horn, P Bartlett, WC Hodge , P Muir, C Toogood, R Wilson Brookers Employment 
Contracts (Brooker's, Wellington, 1991) at EC 27.15 . 
See also above, n 43 , at EC27 . 15 . 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
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Protein Extraction and Manufacturing Co uJ5 Castle J said: 
The practice of dismissal warning procedures being establi s hed a s between 
employer and union has become e xt e nsi ve and has gr e at me rit in that it r e moves 
a troublesome area of uncertaint y in industr i al re lat i ons .. 
However, the requirements that have to be met with regard to warnings 
have also become extensive. Examples of some of the many rules 
developed by the courts are the following: warnings must not only be 
given, but they must be adequate46 ; a prior warning cannot be relied 
on if it has "expi red 1147 ; an adequate period has to be a 11 owed for 
the employee to improve in response to a warning about unsatisfactory 
work48 ; different warnings must be given to the same employee for 
different types of misconduct. 49 
B Necessity for Full and Proper Investigation 
There should generally be an enquiry process leading to the decision 
to dismiss or to take other adverse action against the employee. The 
leading case in this area is the Court of Appeal decision in Airline 
Stewards and Hostesses of New Zealand IUOW v Air New Zealand uJ0. 
In this case the issue was discussed as to whether an employer has 
to prove as a fact the existence of ser i ous misconduct in order to 
justify a dismissal, or whether the employer merely has to show that 
it is justified in accepting that serious conduct occurred after a 
complete and fairly conducted inquiry into the matt e r. Bi s son J held: 
Put bri e fl y, a n employe r in t he conduct and management of its business is not 
ea 11 e d upo n to s it i n j udg me nt of an e mp 1 oyee and require proof beyond 
r easona bl e doubt of a l leged miscondu c t . Wh e n a n incident occurs which raises 
th e q uesti on of misconduc t by an e mp l oyee, t he e mp l oyer is r e quired t o ac t 
fairl y in c onsi d e rin g th e interests o f t he e mpl oye r' s busi ness and of the 
[1981) ACJ 3 19 . 
eg O 'Con n or v We l li n g t on CC [1990) 2 NZILR 128. 
e g NZ Woo ll en Mi ll s JUOW v Ch ris t chu r c h Carpe t Ya rns Ltd [ 19 89 ) 2 NZI LR 14 ; see 
a l s o ab ove n 3. a t 4 .24. 
e g Trott e r v Telecom Corpora t ion of New Zeala n d Lt d [ 1993 ) ERN Z 659; see a l so n 
3, a t 4 .2 2 . 
e g Ro ber t s o n v Ho n da NZ Lt d [ 1991) 3ERNZ 451. See also above n 3, at 4.24. 
[ 1990) 3 NZLR 549. 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
13 
employee's employment in that business . In some situations the facts are so 
clear that instant dismissal is justified. In other situations an explanation 
by the emp 1 oyee may not be fu 11 y satisfactory but sufficient to require 
further consideration and possibly some investigation ... 51 
C Reasons for the Dismissal 
The reasons for the dismissal must be communicated to the employee 
before the dismissal is effected. 52 This means that allegations must 
be put to the employee. This requirement is especially suited to 
cases where the dismissal is based on incompetency. In Donaldson and 
Youngman (t/a Law Courts Hote 7) v Di ckson53 an employee was not 
previously informed that her performance was inadequate, and the 
Court held that it was unfair of the employer to present her with a 
list of complaints at the same time as dismissal . 54 
D Opportunity to be heard 
In general an employer, in giving an employee an opportunity to be 
heard will 
1) te 11 the worker in cl ear terms that di smi ssa l is a 
possibility 
2) tell the worker that he is entitled to seek assistance from 
a union or other representative 
3) tell the worker that any explanation will be taken into 
account. 55 
An employee is entitled to a real as opposed to a nominal hearing 
which should be conducted by the decisionmmaker. An employee must 
have an opportunity to refute, explain or mitigate the alledged 
conduct. 
Above n 39, 2 90 . 
Above n 43, at EC 27 . 18 . 
[ 1994) 1 ERNZ 920; see also VIII D 2 . 
Above n 4, 325 . 
Above n 43, at EC27 . 19 . 
56 
57 
58 
59 
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E Other Factors 
Apart from the requirement of procedural fairness, the Court may also 
take other factors into consideration as a matter of "fairness" in 
some situations. Examples of these are: past record56 ; disparity of 
treatment 57 and alternatives to dismissals. 58 
VI ARE THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TOO DEMANDING? 
A ls the Procedural Fairness Rule Statutorily Imposed? 
It has been argued that because the procedural fairness rule in 
respect of employers who enjoy the statutory right not to be 
"unjustifiably" dismissed, has been held to have been derived from 
the particular construction of the word "unjustifiably", the rule is 
statutorily imposed, rather than being an implied term (which could 
be displaced by an express term in the contract). 59 This 
interpretation was confirmed in Moffat Appliances Ltd v NZ Clerical 
Workers Union60 showing that the Court will not allow employers and 
their employees to contract out61 of the requirement to adhere to the 
high standards of procedural fairness. In this case a wages clerk was 
dismissed without reason about three weeks after signing a contract 
of employment. The contract stipulated that during the first month 
of employment the employee or the company could give one hour's 
notice of termination and that neither party were required to give 
reasons for the termination. 
eg Wellington Local Bodies 0-f-ficers Union v Wellington Regional Hydatids Control 
Authority (1977) !CJ 141. 
eg Northern Clerical Union v Fruitpac UEB Carton (1989) 2 NZILR 664. 
eg Northern Distribution Union v Lightning Transport Ltd (1991) 2 ERNZ 779 . 
Above n 39, 289. 
(1991) 2 ERNZ 437. 
Above n 43, at EC27.15. The words "unless the parties have contracted out of this" 
indicate that the authors do not consider this impossible . 
62 
63 
64 
15 
This view was challenged by the NZ Business Roundtable and the NZ 
Employers Federation 62 who argue that the ECA contains no provisions 
limiting matters which may be contained in an employment contract. 
They contend that although s 147 of the Act does provide that its 
provisions shall have effect notwithstanding any provisions in any 
contract or agreement, the personal grievance provisions merely 
require there to be some procedure for dealing with claims of 
unjustifiable dismissal. The circumstances of the case, including any 
relevant contractual provisions will determine whether a dismissal 
is substantively or procedurally justified. Unless a contractual 
provision is challenged under the harsh and oppressive contracts 
provisions of section 57, parties ought to be able to agree that 
reasons for dismissal need not be given and that contracts may be 
terminated by either party on notice. 
The view above is not correct. Section 26(a) of the ECA states that 
all employment contracts must include an effective personal grievance 
settlement process; s 27(a) explicitly includes unjustifiable 
dismissal as a personal grievance; and s 147 proscribes contracting 
out of the provisions of the ECA.~ Section 32(a) is also especially 
relevant, as it requires the procedure to be "not inconsistent with 
the requirements of this Part of the Act". 
B Increased Litigation 
Ralph Gardiner, a former chief of the Employment Tribunal, mentions 
that 75% of the workload of the Tribunal (mediations and 
adjudications) is made up of personal grievances. He says: "Thus, we 
are saturated with personal grievances, 95% of which are alleged 
unjustifiable dismissal cases 11 • 64 One wonders whether the Employment 
Above n 1 0, 16. 
CW Baird, above n 11, 5 . 
R Gardiner "Personal Grievance Mediation in the Employment Tribunal" (1993) NZ 
Journal of Industrial Relations 343; see also n 10, 7. He states that under the 
LRA more than half the Labour Court's time was taken up with considering personal 
grievances, the great majority of which involved allegations of unjustifiable 
dismissal . 
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Tribunal would not perhaps be less "saturated" if employees who have 
been dismissed with substantive justification were not lured by the 
hope of compensation which may come their way if the Tribunal were 
to rule that there was some or other defect with regard to the 
procedure of their dismissal . 65 
It has been noted that the amount of litigation and involvement of 
lawyers in the resolution of this type of industrial dispute has 
increased, and the common complaint is that lawyers are the only 
group who are benefitting. 66 
Kenneth Johnston67 suggests that it would be a good idea to reinforce 
the theme of s 41 of the ECA~ in such a way as to provide that the 
maximum compensation recoverable for unjustifiable dismissal is the 
greater of three months' remuneration or the balance of the 
remuneration for the period of a fixed term contract (i e no 
compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity, injury to feelings or 
loss of any benefit). This could have the following benefits: 
Employers would be encouraged to take on additional staff if they 
could be certain that the maximum compensation, if the contract of 
employment had to be terminated, would be three months' wages or the 
balance of the remuneration for the period of a fixed term contract. 
It would reduce the amount of litigation in this area considerably, 
for many employers would rather pay three months' wages to an 
employee rather than face the uncertainty and costs of litigation. 
C Pedantic Scrutiny 
It must be conceded that a worker who faces the loss of a job, and 
David Hurley, a member of the Employment Tribunal at Wellington , mentioned, at a 
breakfast meeting of the Arbitrators' Institute of New Zealand, at Palmerston 
North, on 4 July 1995, that many employees come to the Tribunal with "unrealistic" 
expectations of compensation which are far in excess of the actual average awards 
made by the Tribunal. 
Above n 1, 126 . 
Above n 1 , 127. 
See above part VIII B. 
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possibly his reputation, is entitled to the benefit of the rules of 
natural justice, i ea fair procedure. However, there should also be 
some consideration for the employer who has a business to run and has 
to do this efficiently and profitably. It is not fair to expect 
standards of procedure that are so high that an employer is not able 
to dismiss an employee justifiably, even where there is substantive 
justification. 
In NZ Food Processing Union v Unilever NZ Ltd69 Chief Judge Goddard 
said 
Failure to observe any one of these requirements will generally render the 
disciplinary action unjustified . This is not to say that the employer's 
conduct of the di sci pl i nary process is to be put under a microscope and 
subjected to pedantic scrutiny, nor that unreasonably stringent procedural 
requirements are to be imposed. Slight or immaterial deviations from the ideal 
are not to be visited with consequences for the empl eyer wholly out of 
proportion to the gravity, viewed in real terms, of the departure from 
procedural perfection. What is looked at is substantial fairness and 
substantial reasonableness according to the standards of a fair-minded but not 
over-indulgent person. 
This statement has been quoted with approval in a number of 
subsequent cases. 70 In several cases the courts stated that no 
superhuman effort is required from employers to satisfy the 
procedural fairness requirement. In We 7 7 j ngton Road Transport JUW (re 
Hepj) v Fletcher Constructfon Co uJ1 Judge Williamson said: 
... the Court is not required to see whether it can discern some element of 
unfairness in the procedure, but rather whether the procedure was so unfair 
that the dismissal should be set aside regardless of its substantive mer i ts. 
However, in spite of the various dicta stating that the employer's 
conduct is not to be judged too critically, case law shows that the 
Court does at times subject the employer's conduct to "pedantic 
scrutiny". The view has been expressed that the Employment Tribunal 
and Court often take it upon themselves to decide whether they would 
Above n 40. 
eg Finsec v AMP [1992) 1 ERNZ 280; Sparkes v Parkway Co1 lege Board of Trustees 
[1991] 2 ERNZ 851 . 
Above n 34; see also n 20, 1938 . 
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have dismissed and what procedure they would have followed to do so. 
Hugh Fulton suggests that because procedure is a lawyers' topic over 
which they become unreasonably pedantic, 75% of the cases are decided 
on procedural fault or "what I would have done if I was them 11 • 72 
In N Z Food Processing Un ion v Uni 7 ever uJ3 ( the very case in wh i eh 
Chief Judge Goddard spoke out against "pedantic scrutiny") the 
dismissal of a Samoan employee, who had deliberately irritated fellow 
workers, refusing to desist when directed to do so, was held to be 
unjustifiable because the employee was not told prior to the meeting 
that dismissal was likely. The meeting, which was held with the 
employer was attended by the union representative and an interpreter, 
and the worker was afforded the opportunity to be heard. He was not 
able to offer any explanation for his behaviour. It could surely be 
argued that the omission of informing the worker that dismissal was 
possible is a minor defect seeing that it ought to be obvious to an 
employee that obnoxious behaviour puts his job on the line and that 
a meeting with the union representative and an interpreter could 
hardly be held for another reason! One could also ask whether giving 
this worker more time to prepare an excuse for his behaviour would 
have made a difference to the employer's decision. 
In Taurima t/a Looking Good Fashion Jewelry v Moore74 an employee was 
dismissed as shop manager because of her poor performance. About a 
month before the di smi ssa l the employee was warned of possible 
dismissal. She was also given a letter to read on that occasion but 
did not receive a copy. The warning was held to be inadequate by 
Judge Palmer on the grounds that she was not given a copy. It would 
obviously make sense for an employer who has prepared a letter of 
warning to hand the employee a copy to keep. It does not follow, 
however, that because she only read the letter and did not get to 
keep a copy, she was not adequately warned. It is surely not 
unreasonable for an employer to believe that, having issued a warning 
H Fulton , above n 27, 9 . 
Above n 40. 
Unreported, 19 March 1993, Christchurch , CEC 13/ 93 . 
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of possible dismissal, in the event of performance not improving, he 
or she was entitled to dismiss. 
In TA Johannink Ltd v Northern Distribution Uni on75 a store 
manageress was given oral and written warnings over a period of 16 
months. In addition the employer provided "extraordinary support". 
The eventual dismissal was held to be procedurally unfair simply 
because the employer had not decided to dismiss earlier. 
In Burgess v Mu7tiwa77 Packaging Ltd6 a factory worker was dismissed 
because of increasing absenteeism. The written warning to the effect 
that future absence without good reason and advice to the employer 
"could" result in dismissal was held to be an inadequate warning and 
should have read "would"! 
In Teutscher v Hazeldine Private Hospital (1976) uJ7 the Tribunal 
held that the employee, a state registered nurse, had been 
unjustifiably dismissed from her position as nurse at a private 
hospital of 12 beds catering for continuing care patients who were 
wholly or substantially dependent. It was not denied that the 
employee had been responsible for several flagrant acts of misconduct 
which were in breach of her contract of employment and contrary to 
the hospital's rules. The allegations against her (certainly serious 
enough to warrant summary dismissal) were that she had 
1) machine-washed linen contaminated by faeces; and 
2) left a semi-naked patient covered in faeces, unattended; and 
3) fed a patient while the patient was on the toilet 
The employee received both written and oral warnings that her conduct 
was not satisfactory. The Tribunal hel~ that the termination of Ms 
Teutscher's employment was substantially justified, but that the 
employer had not established that it had met the requirements of 
procedural fairness because Ms Teutscher was not given a final 
warning before dismissal. It was held that the previous warnings 
[ 1990] 1 NZILR 874; see al s o n 10, 8. 
[ 1990] 1 NZI LR 970; see also n 10, 9 . 
Unreported, 24 May 1994, Wellington , Vff 105A/ 94 . 
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pertained to misconduct of a different kind to that of feeding a 
patient while the patient was on the toilet. This decision has, with 
reason, been cri ti ci sed as "the height of absurdity". 78 
In Outumarama Private Hospital v Mary Ann Bell and Petra Uta Kraase79 
the Employment Court heard an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal 
upon an unjustified dismissal. Two nurses who were employed by a 
private hospital were dismissed after being caught sleeping on duty 
(after a tip-off was received that they regularly did so). Although 
there was a house rule under which sleeping on the job meant instant 
dismissal, Chief Judge Goddard held that the dismissal was unfair and 
too harsh. He held that the fact that they were seen asleep (having 
made themselves comfortable on sofas with cushions and rugs) could 
not prove that they had deliberately fallen asleep and not simply 
dozed off for a few minutes, and that there was no proof that there 
was any neglect of patients. He held the dismissal to "fall a long 
way short of that serious level of misconduct whi eh is enough to 
disqualify an employee from fitness to continue in her employment" 
and commented that "the respondents have paid a very high rent for 
a few minutes' use of the appellant's pillows and blankets". It does 
seem strange that the Employment Court should dictate the standard 
of nursing care which the employer may expect from its employees, and 
not even mention the danger of neglect which a particular house rule 
was designed to prevent. 
In NZ Nurses Union v United Life Care80 the majority view of the 
Court was that the employer had acted unfairly in dismissing the 
employees because it did not actually have sufficient evidence at the 
time of the di smi ssa l. There was strong dissent, however, by one 
member of the Court who felt that the majority view imposed on 
employers a duty to meet the exacting standards of the Court rather 
than to act as a reasonable lay person, and that an employer could 
hardly be expected to conduct a concentrated four day hearing before 
K Johnston "Procedural 'Fairness"' (1994) Employment law Bulletin 102 . 
Unreported, 5 December 1995, Wellington, WEC 73 / 95 . 
[1989) 3 NZILR 552 . 
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making its decision! 81 
In NZ Woollen Mills Union v Feltex Carpets82 the dismissal of a 
worker for chronic absenteeism was held to be unfair because he had 
been absent from a meeting which was held with the union 
representative in accordance with the procedure set out in his 
contract. The worker was told to attend the meeting, which was held 
with the union representative, but he refused, which meant that the 
meeting, during which the employer decided to dismiss the employee, 
was held in his absence. The worker was awarded $2500 compensation 
for "humilation 11 • 83 One may surely ask why an employer should be 
penalised when the employee has deliberately prevented him from 
following the required "fair" procedure. 
In Air New Zealand v SutherlanJ4 the Court reiterated the opinion 
expressed by Judge Goddard in NZ Food Processing Union v Unileve,.B5 
and stated that the employer's investigation should not be subject 
to "minute or pedantic scrutiny" and that the court should rather 
have regard for fairness from the perspective of both parties. The 
enquiry had to be one which ascertained whether the overall 
principles of fairness had been complied with and not to try to 
identify procedural defects. In this case the Employment Court upheld 
an appeal against a finding by the Tribunal that a cabin crew member 
had been unjustifiably dismissed because of a breach of procedural 
fairness on the grounds that the employee had not been advised of the 
possibility of dismissal at an earlier stage of the process. Judge 
Colgan was satisfied that a thorough enquiry had been conducted in 
a fair way. This case shows clearly that the Tribunal had not avoided 
minute enquiries into every aspect of the procedure where there has 
been substantial compliance with the overall requirements of 
Above n 10, 11 . 
[ 1988) 1 NZILR 848. 
Above n 10, 9. 
[ 1993) 2 ERNZ 10. 
Above n 40. 
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fairness. The Employment Court attempted to balance the need for 
fairness with what is reasonable conduct in a work situation and 
attempted to avoid minute enquiries into every aspect of the 
procedure. However, the Tribunal did not avoid "pedantic scrutiny" 
when the case was first heard, and it is such cases that have led to 
the comments such as "New Zeal and courts .... are handing down an 
a pp a 11 i n g s e r i e s of de c i s i on s on . . . . . d i s mi s s a l cases " . 86 
In BP Oi 1 NZ Ltd v Northern Distdbutfon Workers Unfon87 Judge Hardie 
Boys held: 
... the question is essentially whether the decision to dismiss was one which 
a reasonable and fair employer would have taken in the particular 
circumstances. Thus it is necessarily a question of fact and degree. 
In Eagle Airways Ltd v LanJ8 Judge Palmer said that the question 
that should be asked by a Tribunal is "whether the decision to 
dismiss was one which a reasonable and fair employer would have taken 
in the particular circumstances." Judge Palmer expressed his concern 
that in some cases the Tribunal may have misapplied this test and 
instead substituted its own view for that of the employer. 
In Airline Stewards and Hostesses of New Zealand IUOW v Air New 
ZealanJ9 the Court held that "the decision [to dismiss) must be 
looked at from two points of view, that is, fairness to the employer 
and fairness to the employee .... '' 
However, there can hardly be "fairness to the employer" when the 
procedural requirements are contained in an ever-increasing and 
complicated body of law which is not easily accessible to and 
digestible by the average employer, whose conduct is often subject 
to the pedantic scrutiny of the courts. 
R Kerr, above n 11,10. 
[1992) 3 ERNZ 483 . 
Unreported , 20 February 1995, Auckland, AEC 5/95. 
Above n 50. 
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D Redundancy and Fixed Term Contracts 
Redundancy and fixed term contracts are contentious topics that 
deserve to be treated in depth and at length. It is not possible to 
do so within the short space of this paper, and they are therefore 
only briefly discussed to illustrate the added burden which is placed 
on the employer. 
In Bdghouse Ltd v Bi lderbec~O the Court of Appeal held that 
redundancy is a dismissal which may give rise to a personal 
grievance . If the dismissal was not effected in a procedurally fair 
manner, it will be held to be unjustifiable even if the redundancy 
is genuine. Recently i n Phipps v New Zealand Fishing Industry BoarJ1 
it was held that unless the employer demonstrated that the procedure 
to show that the decision as to the genuine redundancy s i tuation was 
fair and reasonable, the employer could not argue that the dismissal 
was substantially justified. 
Although the ECA promotes freedom of contract and s 9 prov i des that 
"the type of contract and the contents of the contract [are] i n each 
case a matter for negotiation", the Employment Court has imposed 
restrictions and holds fixed term contracts to be subject to 
restraints. In Actors Equity v Auckland Theatre Trust92 the major i ty 
decision was that the failure to renew a f ixed term contract was not 
a dismissal. In a di ssenting opin i on, Cooke P argued that th e failur e 
to renew a fixed term contract could form the basis of a personal 
grievance. In N Z Food Processing Union v ICI (NZ) uJ3, howeve r, 
the court held that the dismissal of a worker whose fi xed term 
contract, with a clause permitting an extention of the term , was not 
renewed and no reasons were gi ven, to be unjustified. The court 
disagreed with the views expressed in th e Ac tors Equity ca se , namel y 
[1992] 2 ERN Z 161; see also H Ful t on n 27, 17; see also n 2, 11 . 
[1996) ERN Z 195; see below par t VI I A. 
[1989] 2 NZLR 154; see also H Ful t on n 27, 7. 
[1989] 3 NZ I LR 24; see also H Fulton n 27, 7. 
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that there is no room for the personal grievance procedure where, 
upon the expiry of a fixed term contract, it is not renewed or 
continued. In Smith v Radio i uJ4 the Employment Court confirmed 
that the personal grievance provisions apply to a fi xed term contract 
unless the contract was genuinely related to the operation or 
requirements of the business of the employer, or the employer can 
discharge the burden of proving that there was a genuine reason for 
the fixed term of employment and the employer has considered whether 
the genuine need, at the time of the creation of the contract, for 
its termination on a particular date still existed when the expiry 
of the contract was imminent, or there was no express or implied 
promise of renewal that has not been kept. 
With regard to both redundancy and the termination of f ixed t e rm 
contracts, case law shows that the courts, in order to protect the 
worker, have i ncreasi ngl y treated both these situat i ons as 
dismissals, with the attendant burden of the procedural f a i rnes s 
requirement on the employer. 
The NZ Business Roundtable and the NZ Employers Federation 95 s uggest 
the following additions to s 27 (wh i ch def i nes "personal gr i evance ") 
that would limit the relevance of procedural fa i rness in dismissals 
based on grounds of genuine redundancy and th e t e rmination of f ixed 
term contracts. With regard to redundan cy: 
(7) Where, in any proceedings for settling a personal grievance pursuant 
to a p r oced ur e under s 32 of this Act, an employer proves that an 
employee was dismissed on th e g r ounds of redundancy the dismissal shall 
not be held to be unjustifiable-
(a) by reaso n o n ly of t he failure of that employer t o observe, follow 
or a d here to any procedural requirements in making or carrying out the 
decision to dismiss 
With regard to fi xed term contracts: 
(3) An employee shall not be held to have been unjustifiably dismissed by 
r eason only of t h e fact that an employment contract wh ich was expressed 
t o be a fixed term has expired according to its tenor . 
( 1995) 1 ER NZ 28 1 ; see aslo H Fu lt on n 27, 7-8; see also n 2, 13. 
Above n 10, 45- 4 6. 
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VII THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
A No Substance Without Procedure? 
In Madden v NZ Railways Corporation96 Chief Judge Goddard pointed out 
the close relationship between the two elements of justification: 
substantive reasons and procedural fairness: 97 
... an employer who has failed to give its employee an adequate oportunity of 
being heard prior to a dismissal for misconduct cannot be said to have had any 
valid reason to reach a conclusion adverse to the employee and therefore is 
treated as if it had not reached it. It thus becomes unhelpful to distinguish 
in such situtation between substantive and procedural justification. 
In Nelson Air Ltd v NZALPA 98 the Court of Appeal stated: 
In considering such a question it is often convenient to distinguish 
between procedural and substantive unfairness. But there is no sharp 
dichotomy. In the end the overall question is whether the employee has 
been treated fairly in all the circumstances. 99 
In a recent case, Drummond v Coca Cola Bottlers Nz100 , the Court 
emphasised that an employer will not be able to demonstrate 
substantive fairness of a dismissal if a proper procedure is not 
followed. In this case the employee was summarily dismissed for 
dishonesty when seen stuffing a promotional T shirt down his 
trousers, which he admitted taking. At a further meeting he said it 
was a joke. The Chief Judge said: 
It is now well settled that it is incorrect to look at dismissals separately 
from the point of view of substantive justification and procedural fairness, 
especially in that order, for it is likely to lead to a mindset that on 
certain assumptions the dismissal must be justified, leading to a reluctance 
to defeat the making of those assumptions by criticism of what is sometimes 
described as "mere procedure". The true enquiry is one that looks at the 
dismissal overall but it would be no exaggeration to say that the enquiry into 
procedure should come first. As everybody knows, procedure is power. Those who 
[1991] 2 ERNZ 690. 
Above n 4, 220. 
[ 1994) 2 ERNZ 665. 
Above n 43, at EC27. 13. 
[ 1995] 2 ERNZ 229. 
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have the control of the procedure may well thereby unfairly obtain control of 
the outcome. That is why it is necessary for control of the procedure to be 
shared. It is no use asking whether the employer honestly believed in the 
existence of bad motives or bad faith on the part of the employer if a 
procedure was not followed that had at least a chance of getting at the truth 
on that score. Thus it is that an employer who has not conducted a fair 
enquiry into a serious allegation such as an allegation of dishonesty cannot 
be allowed to insist that it had an honest belief in th e truth of the 
allegation. 
The Chief Judge held that the employer had to establish an intent to 
steal. The enquiry by the Employment Tribunal and the Employment 
Court is into the dismissal overall, but the enquiry into procedure 
should come first. 101 The Chief Judge's comments on sharing the 
control of the outcome has been criticised as illustrating the 
pedantic detail of procedure in the nature of a trial that is 
required of an employer. 1~ 
This case was followed by Tupu v Romanos Pizzas103 in which the 
Employment Court allowed an appeal and severely criticised the 
Employment Tribunal for holding that the worker had been guilty of 
serious misconduct, in effect sabotaging the employer's business, 
even though the di smi ssa l was held to be unjustified because of 
procedural defects. The Court held that it was not for the Employment 
Tribunal to decide what the worker had done by way of misconduct 
until dealing with remedies. It should have first asked if the 
employer had held a fair enquiry and only if so to ask if the 
employer formed a view of the worker's guilt. Such a view must be 
reasonably held. The Court stressed that it is the employer and its 
handling of the dismissal that is on trial, not the employee! 104 
More recently the same approach was seen in Phipps v The New Zealand 
In this case th e dismissal was held not to be unjustified, and it is the ratio 
decidendi that is criticised, not the actual decision itself. 
H Fulton, above n 27, 11 . 
[1995) 2 ERNZ 266. 
H Fulton, above n 27, 11. 
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Fishing Industry BoarJOS where the di smi ssa l was for redundancy due 
to reorganisation. The Tribunal found the dismissal unjustified on 
the grounds of procedural unfairness because of a lack of 
consultation and because there was no attempt to consider 
alternatives to redundancy. The Employment Court held that the 
Tribunal was wrong in taking a two-step approach and particularly 
looking at the substantive before the procedural justification. 
Unless the employer justified the redundancy by showing that it acted 
in a fair and reasonable manner when making the decision, the 
employer could not argue that the dismissal was justified 
substantively. A decision of substantive justification was therefore 
unnecessary, wrong, and the fact that the redundancy was genuine was 
irrelevant! 
The Drummond, Tupu and Phipps decisions lead to the conclusion that 
is is not appropriate for an employer defending an unjustified 
dismissal claim to lead evidence of the employee's misconduct, 
incompetence or redundancy. The Employment Tribunal's task is to 
determine, on the facts that the employer had at the time it made its 
decision, whether the decision reached was one that a fair and 
reasonable employer would have made in all the circumstances.To 
enable the Tribunal to make this assessment, an employer must first 
show that a fair procedure was followed. If not, the dismissal is 
unjustifiable. 
This reasoning may be theoretically sound, but the results are not 
always fair, seeing that there have been many cases where the breach 
of procedural fairness made no difference to the decision on the 
substantive merits as they appeared at the hearing. 106 
B A Comparison with Judicial Review Cases 
The finding of an unjustified dismissal has been compared to what 
[1996) 1 ERNZ 195 . 
Above n 1 0, 13. 
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happens in judicial review cases. 107 With judicial review it is the 
validity of the decision that is at issue, not the actual merits of 
the decision. If the decision is found to be invalid, it will be set 
aside and is therefore nullified or deprived of effect. There is 
therefore no valid decision. Bernard Banks asks whether, in the case 
of unjustified dismissal, it would not be logical to consider the 
dismissal as not being valid, and whether the remedies should stem 
from this. He suggests that the employer should make a fresh, 
hopefully valid, decision as to dismissal, and points out that if an 
employer, having dismissed an employee, were met with a claim of 
procedural unfairness, the employer might assess the strength of that 
claim and elect to reconsider it. 
The reasoning in the view described above is in keeping with the 
explanation which the courts give for subordinating substantive 
justification to procedural fairness. The argument is that 
substantive justification cannot be argued by the employer if the 
procedure was not fair, because the employer was not in the position 
to make a reasonable and fair decision . According to this reasoning 
it should follow that the only way substantive justification can be 
determined, if at all, would be for the employer to "repeat" the 
dismissal using a procedure which is fair. The courts, however, 
cont radi et themselves by holding, on the one hand, that i n a case 
where an employee had been dismissed by means of an "unfa i r" 
procedure, the employer is not able to determine substantive 
justification for the dismissal, and on the other hand finding it 
quite acceptable for the employer to prove substantive justification 
when pleading the reduction of remedies because of contributory 
conduct. The courts have also repeatedly stated that it is not its 
function to try the employee for some crime or employment 
misdemeanour, but to scrutinise the quality of the employer's 
decision to dismiss. 108 
B Banks "Proc edural Fai rn ess - A Cas e for Rec on si d era t io n " ( 4 Ju ne 1996) Employment 
Law Bulletin 5 9 . 
e9 Tupu v Romanos P izzas , above n 103. 
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C Should the Procedural Requirement be Removed? 
The procedural fairness requirement was not universally accepted. 
When the Employment Contracts Bill was tabled by the National 
Government at the end of 1990, it included cl 17(3) which provided 
.. ,the failure by an employer to observe, follow, or adhere to any procedural 
requirements (whether imposed by law or by contract or otherwise) in making a 
decision to dismiss an employee shall not of itself render that dismissal 
unjustifiable, if, but for that failure, the dismissal would otherwise have 
been substantively justifiable. 
In his speech introducing the Bill the Minister of Labour stated that 
the Bill would enable only dismissals that are unjustified in 
substance to be ruled unjustifiable. The Law Commission recommended 
that a change of termi no 1 ogy from unjust i fi ab 1 e di smi ssa 1 to "without 
good reason" would permit concentration on substantive rather than 
procedural aspects of dismissal . 109 The inclusion of the clause was 
favoured by the NZ Employers' Federation. 110 
Because of vigorous opposition the clause was struck out from the 
Bill, voicing the fear that employees would deny natural justice to 
emp 1 oyees. The c 1 a use was a 1 so considered as "badly drafted" 111 and 
clearly 11 unworkable 11112 because of procedural and substantive 
justification being closely intertwined and not unrelated as implied. 
Bronwyn Boon sought to determine what impact cl 17(3) of the 
Employment Contracts Bill would have on the unjustified dismissal 
decisions if it had been included in the final version of the 
ECA. 113 In order to suggest possible effects, she examined samples 
of dismissal appeal decisions under the LRA during the period 1987 
NZLC R18 1991. 
The NZ Business Roundtable favoured the removal of personal grievance procedures 
from the legislation; see also n 22, 304. 
Above n 3, at 4.1. 
A Geare Employments Contracts Act 1991 (Research Centre for Industrial Realations 
and Labour Studies, University of Otago, 1991) 9. 
Above n 22, 301-317. 
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to 1991. Of the cases she studied, most of the decisions were based 
on matters of unfair procedure, while a little under half involved 
lack of substantive justification. 114 The removal of procedural 
fairness considerations from the unjustified dismissal decision would 
therefore have a significant impact on the decision process and the 
result would be that the number of cases found to be unjustified 
would drop from three-quarters to under one-half. Boon argues, 
however, that such a conclusion assumes that the rat i onale for the 
decision will remain the same and that decisionmakers will still 
define inadequacies of the employer's behaviour in terms of 
procedural inadequacies and that these matters will be ignored to 
comply with the requirements of the legislation. She says that 
because of the difficulties of differentiating between matters of 
substantive justification and procedural fairness, issues contained 
under the principles of the opportunity to explain, inadequate 
investigation of the facts and inadequate warnings, would be 
incorporated into the proof of substantive justification. Because the 
legislation has, since 1973, left the task of establishing the 
mechanisms by which the personal grievance procedure operates to the 
courts, a body of case law which acknowledges and reflects these 
principles by which they operate has been developed. It is Boon's 
opinion that it does not make sense to prohibit the judiciary from 
using the essential principles upon which they base their practice. 
Clause 17(3) would have retained the judiciary in the central 
administrative role in the personal grievance procedure, but would 
at the same time have removed the major principle through which the 
court would have performed this task . 115 The argument here is that 
cl 17(3) would have resulted in the exclusion of a significant 
criterion for assessing the adequacy of employer behaviour. The 
assessment of substantive justification would have become more 
rigorous and former matters of procedural fairness would have become 
matters of substantive justification. 
The argument above is based on the assumption that it i s difficult 
Abov e n 22, 3 14 . 
Above n 22 , 3 15 . 
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to separate substantive from procedural justification. In most cases, 
however, this is not the case. 
D The Position in the UK 
In contrast to Boon's view that the Court would have great difficulty 
separating procedural fairness from substantive just i fication, one 
could mention that the courts in the United Kingdom, where the "no 
difference" rule was used for several years under the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 (UK), did not find this task 
impossible. This rule subordinated procedural to substantive issues 
in the finding of fairness, and meant that a failure to e xerc i se 
procedural fairness was only relevant if following the correct 
procedure would have made a difference to the employer's final 
decision. 11 6 In 1987 this approach was overruled in Polkey v A E 
Dayton Services ud 17 whi eh set out a test whi eh is sti 11 not as 
onerous as the one applied by the New Zealand courts . In this case 
there had been a redundancy dismissal without consultat i on and the 
House of Lords held that the question the Tribunal should as k is 
whether the employer had been reasonable, or unreasonable, in 
deciding to dismiss, not whethe r the employee would nevertheless have 
dismissed even if there had been consultation or warning. The 
Tribunal should c onsider whether at the time when the employe r took 
the decision to dismiss the employer could reasonably have con c luded 
that consultation warn i ng would be useless. Lord Mac kay sa i d: 
It is wha t t he employer di d that is to be jud ged, not wh at he might have done . 
On th e oth er hand when judging whet her wha t the e mployer did was reasonable it 
is rig ht to consider what a r easonable employer would have had in mind at the 
t i me he deci d ed to dismiss .. ...... .. .... I f t h e employer cou l d reasonably 
have co ncl uded in t he l igh t of t h e circumst a nces known t o him at the time of 
dis mi ssa l t hat consultation or warning woul d b e utterly useless he might well 
act reasonably even if he did not observe t he provisions of t he Code. Failure 
to observe the requirement of the Code r elating to consultation or warning 
will not necessarily re nder a dismissal unfair. Whet her in any particular case 
i t did so is a matter for th e Industrial Tri bunal to consider in the light of 
th e circums t ances known to the employer at t he time he dismissed t he employee. 
Above n 17, 268; see also n 43, at EC27.14.eg 8 ri t ish labou r Pump Co Lt d v Byrne 
(1 97 9] I CR 347 . 
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The House of Lords approved earlier authority that the weight to be 
attached to procedural failure should depend on the circumstances 
known at the time of dismissal . It was conceded that there would be 
cases where the offence of misconduct is so grave and the facts so 
clear, that a reasonable employer could on the facts known at the 
time of dismissal take the view that an y explanation the employee may 
offer would make no difference. Likewise, in a case where it is not 
reasonable for the employer to dismiss without giving an opportunity 
to explain, but facts which subsequently come to light or are proved 
before the Tribunal show that dismissal i s in fact merited, 
compensation would be reduced to nil, ensuring that an employee who 
could have been fairly dismissed does not get compensat i on. 118 
In contrast to the approach followed in the United Ki ngdom, the 
approach developed by the courts in New Zealand places so much 
emphasis on procedural fairness that an employee whose dismissal 
would otherwise have been justified, is abl e to coll ect compensation 
simply because of mino r procedural def ects. 
E Limiting the Relevance of Procedural Fairness 
The NZ Business Roundtable and NZ Employers Fede ration r ecommend that 
the definition of personal grievan ce be amended by add i ng pr ovi s ions, 
based on the English legislation, that would lim i t th e r e l evan ce of 
procedural fairness . 119 They suggest that the fo 11 ow i ng s ubsect i on s 
should be added to s 27: 
(3) In de t e rm i n i ng, f or th e purposes of this Act , whether an em p loyee has 
b een un j ustifiably dismissed, or whether an employer's action, judged 
u nd er s u bparag r a ph (b) of subsection (1) of t his section is 
unjustif iable, i t shall be for the employer to show-
(a) wha t was the re a son (or, if there was more than one, the principal 
reason) for t h e dis missal or other action, and 
( b ) tha t it was a r eason falli n g wi t hin subsection (4) of this section 
o r some ot her subs tan tia l reason of a kind suc h a s t o j ustify either 
t h e dis missal of an e mpl oyee holding t he position which that e mployee 
Cf VIII D 2. 
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held, or the action which has been challenged, as the case may be. 
(4) In paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section the reference to a 
reason falling within this subsection is a reference to a reason which 
(a) related to the capability or qualifications of the employee for 
performing the work of the kind which the employee has been employed 
by the employer to do, or 
(b) related to the conduct or performance of the employee, or 
(c) was provided for in the employee's employment contract, or 
(d) was that the employee was redundant, or 
(e) was that the employee could not continue to work in the position 
which the employee held without contravention (either on the employee's 
part or that the employee's employer) of a duty or restriction imposed 
by the law . 
(5) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (3) of 
this section then the determination of the question whether the 
dismissal or other action was justifiable or unjustifiable, having 
regard to the reasons shown by the employer, shall depend on whether 
in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources 
of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or 
unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the 
employee or otherwise acting in the manner which has been challenged; 
and that question shall be determ i ned in accordance with equity and the 
substantial merits of the case (which shall inc lude reference to the 
terms of the employee's employment contract). 
As mentioned before120 , "unjustifiable dismissal" is not defined by 
the ECA nor was it defined by the IRA or LRA. It has, however, been 
given a complicated content by the body of law developed by the 
courts. The definition suggested above would therefore make a 
dramatic change. 
VIII CONTRIBUTORY CONDUCT AND THE REDUCTION OF REMEDIES 
A Clause 17(3) of the Employment Contracts Bill 
Because of the decision to omit cl 17(3) of the Employment Contracts 
Bill, which would have removed the procedural fairness 
requirement, 121 s 40(2) was inserted into the ECA. The failure to 
change the position with regard to procedural fairness led to a 
Above part III . 
See above part VII C. 
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corresponding emphasis upon remedies in such cases (the policy 
apparently being that any "employee fault" has to be dealt with by 
remedies, not by restricting the grievance procedure). 122 However , 
this new provision was not e xpected to make a difference to the 
practice of the Tribunal and the Court as the Court had already, 
under the 1987 Act (the LRA), taken the complainant ' s conduct into 
account in determining compensation and reimbursement. 123 
Although the requirement of procedural fairness i n dismissals was 
retained, the opposition to it, and especially the comments of the 
Law Commission, indicate that some unease e xisted at the t i me 
concerning the emphasis on procedural fairness. See i ng that the 
reduction of remedies because of contributory fault is the only 
relief available to an employer124 who has bee n held to have 
dismissed an employee in a manner wh i ch is procedurally unfa i r, 
although with substantive justification, the question i s: is the 
imbalance adequately redressed? I n order to answer th i s quest i on, it 
is necessary to examine the statutory provi si on s regarding 
contributory conduct as well as th e way i n wh i ch th e courts hav e 
interpreted these prov i sion s . 
B The Statutory Provisions 
There are two provisions in the ECA that ar e r e leva nt t o contributo r y 
conduct and the reduction of remedie s . 
The first is s 40(2) which provide s 
Wh ere t he Trib u nal or Co u r t determines that an employee has a personal 
gr i e v ance by reason of being unjustifiably dismissed, the Tribunal or Court 
s h all, in deciding both t h e nature and the extent of the remedies to be 
provided in respect of the personal grievance, consider the extent to which 
th e a c t ions of the employee contributed towards the situation that gave rise 
to t h e personal grievance, and sha 11 , if those actions so require, reduce the 
Above n 4 3, at EC40.07. 
J Hughes, above n 12, 112. 
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remedies that would otherwise have been awarded accordingly. 
This provision does not apply to any personal grievance, but only to 
an unjustifiable dismissa1. 125 
The reduction, however, applies to any of the remedies enumerated in 
s 40(1)(a) (c), namely reimbursement of wages, reinstatement, 
compensation for humiliation, loss of dignity or loss of any benefit. 
The second provision is s 41(3) which is similar to section 40(2). 
It provides that where the Tribunal or Court has determined that an 
employee has a personal grievance and has lost remuneration as a 
result of the personal grievance 
where -
(a) The Tribunal or the Court is obliged to make an order under subsection (1) 
of this section; and 
(b) The Tribunal or the Court is satisfied that the situation that gave rise 
to the personal grievance resulted in part from fault on the part of the 
employee in whose favour the order is to be made, -
the Tribunal or the Court shall reduce, to such extent as it thinks just and 
equitable, the sum that would otherwise be ordered to be paid to the employee 
by way of reimbursement. 
This provision applies only to the reimbursement of lost 
remuneration, but is not restricted to unjustifiable dismissals, as 
it applies to any personal grievance. Section 41(3) is equivalent to 
s 229(3) of the Labour Relations Act 1987. 126 
C The "three steps" set out in Paykel Ltd v Ahlfeld. 127 
Paykel Ltd v Ah7fe7ct 28 was an appeal against the level of remedies 
awarded for an unjustifiable dismissal. The employee had been 
J Hughes, above n 12, 112 . 
Above n 43, at EC41.05. 
[1993] 1 ERNZ 334. 
Above n 127. 
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dismissed from his managerial position because of dissatisfaction 
with his performance. The employee was not sufficiently warned that 
his performance had placed his employment in jeopardy. The employer 
sought to have the remedies awarded reduced because of the employee's 
contributory conduct. The Court held that the Tribunal had erred in 
refusing to accept an argument of contributory conduct. Judge Travis 
first considered s 40(2). He pointed out that there are three steps 
that must be followed in making a decision as to whether remedies 
must be reduced: 129 
(i) There must be a finding of unjustifiable dismissal. 
(ii) The Tribunal is required to consider "the extent to which 
the actions of the employee contributed towards the situation 
which gave rise to the dismissal". This is therefore a matter 
of causation as there must be a causal link between the conduct 
and the situation giving rise to the dismissal. Judge Travis 
stated categorically that "if there is no causal link between 
the employee's conduct and the situation which gave rise to the 
dismissal, there can be no reduction in the remedies. Thus, if 
the employer discovers, after the dismissal, that the employee 
had been guilty of serious misconduct, previously unknown, 
which would have justified a dismissal, that conduct cannot be 
taken into account under this subsection." It was al so held 
that an employee's actions covered all conduct, both things 
done and undone. At this stage of the inquiry the 
blameworthiness of an employee's actions are not relevant. The 
Tribunal merely has to establish the causal link. Judge Travis 
held that in the present case the Tribunal was bound by the 
provisions of s 40(2) to determine whether the respondent's 
actions contributed to the situation which in turn gave rise 
to the dismissal. 
(iii) The third step requires that the Tribunal "shall" reduce 
the remedies that would otherwise have been awarded "if the 
S Woodward "The Relevance of Employee Actions to Personal Grievance Remedies" 
(1995) Employment Law Bulletin, 127 . 
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actions so require". At this stage the culpability or 
blameworthiness of the employee becomes relevant. Depending on 
the degree of culpability, the reduction may vary from no 
reduction to the award of no remedies at all. If the employer's 
warnings had been issued to the employee and an opportunity 
afforded him to improve his performance, and there was no 
response, the Tribunal would be justified in finding a 
substantial level of contribution. Judge Travis held that 
procedural fairness, although not relevant to the second step 
of finding a causal link, is relevant to this third step. 
Judge Travis followed the approach of the English Court of Appeal in 
Nelson v British Broadcasting Corporation (No 2)1 30 in which it was 
held that an award of compensation to a successful complainant could 
only be reduced on the ground that he contributed to his dismissal 
by his own conduct if the conduct on his part relied on for this 
purpose was culpable or blameworthy. 
Judge Travis then turned to s 41(3) of the ECA. This provision is 
limited to claims of remuneration lost as a result of, but not 
limited to, unjustifiable dismissal. The wording of s 41(3) does not 
refer to "actions" but to "fault". Subsection (1) requires a minimum 
reimbursement of the lesser of the actual remuneration lost or three 
months' lost remuneration. Subsection (3) allows this to be reduced 
in the circumstance set out in para (b) if the situation giving rise 
to the grievance arose "in part from fault on the part of the 
employee". Judge Travis held that under this provision the final two 
steps required under s 40(2) are effectively compressed into one. 
There must be a fault and that fault must have resulted in the 
situation giving rise to the grievance. The causal link must once 
again be demonstrated. This requires the Tribunal to find that the 
employee was guilty of blameworthy conduct and that this conduct was 
causative of the situation that gave rise to the personal grievance. 
It is important to note that Judge Travis implied that there is no 
[1980) ICR 110. 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
38 
substantial difference between ss 40{2) and 41{3) of the ECA. 131 
D Causation, Blameworthiness and Proportionality 
The application of either s 40{2) or 42{3) raises issues of 
causation, blameworthiness, and proportionality. 132 
1 Causation 
In Paykel Ltd v Ahlfeld 33 Judge Travis, as mentioned above, 
emphatically stated that there can be no reduction in the remedies 
if the employer discovers, after the dismissal, that the employee had 
been guilty of serious misconduct that was previously unknown. The 
reason for this was given as the lack of a causal link between the 
employee's conduct and the situation which gave rise to the 
di smi ssa l . 
In Macadam v Port Nelson Ltd (No 2) 134 Judge Goddard, too, stressed 
that if there is no causal connection to the situation giving rise 
to the grievance, then misconduct, no matter how serious, is 
i r re l e van t . 135 
In Carlton and United Breweries (NZ) Pty v Bourke136 , however, a 
different approach was taken with regard to causation. This was an 
appeal against an award of compensation made by the Employment 
Tribunal. The contributory conduct consisted of a fraudulent charge 
which the employee made to the company for repairs to his privately 
Employment Institutions Information Cent re," Employment Cases Summary", August 
1994, 3. 
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owned car. This incident was not discovered until after the 
dismissal, which had been precipitated by the employer's concern over 
the employee's unsatisfactory performance and non-performance of 
managerial duties. The court had to decide what bearing the 
misconduct had on the level of compensation for unjustifiable 
dismissal. The problem was that the ECA itself only provides for a 
reduction for contributory conduct where there is a causative link 
between the conduct and the dismissal (ss 40(2) and 41(3)). 137 Judge 
Palmer stated: 
... to adopt Mr Bumble's aphorism 'the law [would indeed be] an ass' if, in an 
employment setting, the Tribunal - and now th i s court upon appeal - was to 
ignore as irrelevant deliberate and serious misconduct by an employee . .. 
because such misconduct was not known to the employer at the time it dismissed 
the particular employee for unrelated misconduct .... 
Judge Palmer then pointed out that the Employment Court is a Court 
of Equity and is expressly empowered by s 104(3) 138 of the ECA to 
exercise its specialist adjudication jurisdiction "as in equity and 
good conscience it thinks fit". The Court wholly quashed the award 
of lost benefits made to the employee by the Tribunal, and 
substantially reduced the sum awarded as compensation for distress, 
humiliation and injury to feeling. 
It has been argued that the Carlton decision may open the door for 
a critical analysis of an employee's performance over the entire 
period of his employment in an effort to discredit his character and 
reduce an award of compensation. 139 On the other hand it can be 
argued that the Carlton decision clearly illustrates that a strict 
interpretation of ss 40(2) and 41(3) of the ECA can lead to results 
that are unfair to the employer. It would be a gross injustice to an 
employer if an employee who was guilty of serious misconduct were to 
be awarded remedies that are not reduced, merely because the 
misconduct had been concealed prior to the dismissal. The fact that 
the general focus of the personal grievance procedure is on whether 
Above n 4, 405. 
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a dismissal can be shown to be justified on the facts known to the 
employer at the time of the dismissal can therefore lead to unfair 
results. 
In the UK the test with regard to causation is not as onerous. In 
Po 7 key v A E Dayton Services uJ40 the House of Lords stated that 
where it is not reasonable for the employer to dismiss without giving 
an opportunity to explain, but facts subsequently discovered or 
proved before the Tribunal show that dismissal was in fact merited, 
compensation would be reduced to nil to ensure that an employee who 
could have been fairly dismissed does not get compensation 141 . This 
approach, echoed by ~he Carlton decision (discussed above) is 
preferable to the strict approach in the Paykel decision, because the 
results are fairer. 
The NZ Business Roundtable and NZ Employers Federation 142 recommend 
that s 40(2) of the ECA be deleted and replaced by the following: 
(2) Where the Tribunal or the Court determines that an employee has a 
personal grievance under either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of 
subsection (1) of section 27 of this Act, the Tribunal or the Court 
shall, in deciding both the nature and the extent of the remedies to 
be provided in respect of that personal grievance, consider-
(a) The extent to which the actions of the employee contributed towards 
the situation that gave rise to the personal grievance, and 
(b) All material facts adduced by the employer or employee (whether 
available to the employer or the employee at the time the grievance 
arose or not) 
and shall, if those actions or facts so require, reduce the remedie s that 
would otherwise have been awarded accordingly . 
The NZ Business Roundtable and the NZ Employers Federation argue that 
this amendment would make it explicit' that the Tribunal or Court 
should take into account, 1 n determining the appropriate remedy, 
material facts that have become known since the dismissal. 143 One 
Above n 117; see also above part VII C; see also H Fulton n 27, 12-13 . 
See above part VII 0. 
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must assume, however, that the Court would be able to distinguish 
between such "material facts" that have become known since the 
dismissal, and a mere effort to discredit the employee on the part 
of the employer. 
2 Blameworthiness 
In Paykel Ltd v Ahlfeld 44 it was held that it is the degree of 
culpability which will determine the variation of reduction from no 
reduction to the award of no remedies at all. Judge Travis held that 
procedural fairness may be relevant to culpability, and that in this 
case the Tribunal was justified in finding that, in the absence of 
warnings, the employee was entitled to assume he was carrying out 
his duties satisfactorily. 
In Donaldson and Youngman (t/a Law Courts Hotel) v Dickson145 
Judge Goddard discussed the requirement of blameworthiness for the 
reduction of remedies and commented, at 930: 
The applicant could not be found guilty of blameworthy conduct if she was 
working at her job in ignorance of any dissatisfaction with her discharge of 
her duties unless she was guilty of gross, and obvious defaults . 
This strict approach may be fair in a case where an employee is 
unaware of any dissatisfaction which the employer may have. This 
cannot be said of all cases as there will be circumstances where 
employees must know, even without warning, that their services are 
not satisfactory. 
In Wholesale Plant Nursery Ltd v Johnston146 the Employment Court 
criticised the "inappropriately rigid approach" to s 40(2) in Paykel 
Ltd v Ahlte1J 47 - to determine that contributory conduct of the 
Above n 127 . 
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employee must be held not to require reduction of the remedies where 
the employer has not sufficiently informed the employee of his/her 
unsatisfactory performance. In this case an employee who was emp l eyed 
on a probationary basis was dismissed because of her sarcastic manner 
of dealing with customers and staff, and her unwilling nature. The 
Employment Tribunal had awarded $8,000 for humiliation, which the 
Employment Court held should be set at $5,000, with a further 
reduction of 50% because of the employee's contributory conduct, even 
though the empl eyer had not warned the employee of any 
dissatisfaction with her work. This approach is to be commended, 
especially in a case such as this where it could hardly be argued 
that the employee would have been unaware of her sarcastic manner and 
unwilling nature! 
In Robertson v Port Nelson uJ 48 the Appeal Court held that the 
actions of an employee, whose dismissal was unjustifiable on 
procedural grounds, were held not to be blameworthy. He had been 
suffering from a mental condition and during this time he made 
nuisance phone calls to management. The court held that the mental 
condition (from which he later recovered ) had deprived him of any 
liability in this respect. As a result there was no reduction of the 
remedies which amounted to full lost earnings plus $5,000 
compensation. 
A different approach was taken in Wilson v Sleepyhead Manufacturing 
Co uJ 49 . In this case the unjustifiable dismissal concerned an 
epileptic worker who had suffered two seizures at work. The 
employer's motivation for dismissing the employee was that his work 
required him to work with a welding torch at a great height and that 
he could fall and be disabled if he had another seizure. The court 
held that although the employee was clearly not at fault in having 
a seizure, the "windfall " of $7,039 (being three months' ordinary 
remuneration by virtue of s 41(3)) would be somewhat punitive on the 
employer. The court therefore reduced this amount to $5,000 by 
[1994] 1 ERNZ 976 . 
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exercising "equity and good conscience" . 
The requirement of blameworthiness or fault sounds fair but is not 
necessarily so in practice, as shown in the Robertson and Sleepyhead 
decisions above. Although the reduction in the Sleepyhead case was 
not a considerable one, the decision shows that the Court recognised 
the fact that an absence of fault on the part of the employee should 
not necessarily be a bar to the reduction of remedies. The Robertson 
decision, on the other hand, cannot be said to be fair to the 
employer because the result was that the "fault", not found with the 
employee, was by implication transferred to the employer! 
3 Proportionality 
Proportionality involves determining the level of fault on the part 
of the employee in order to determine the reduction of remedi es. 
In Davis Trading Co Ltd v Lewi ~~ Chief Judge Goddard drew from th e 
Law Commission's draft Bill, "Apportionment of Ci vi l Liab i lity 11 , 151 
which deals with contributory conduct in contract and tort claims. 
He applied to an employment situation the princ i ple that 
apportionment must be to such extent as is just and equitabl e having 
regard to 
(a) t he na t u r e, quali t y and causative effect of 
( i) th e wronged person's failure (if any) to act with due regard for that 
pe r so n 's o wn interest, and 
(ii) th e acts a nd omissions of the wrongdoer ... and 
(b) th e righ t s and o b liga t ions of the wronged person and the wrongdoer .. in 
r e l a t ion to one anot her. 
An employee therefore has a respons i bil i ty to act with regard to his 
or her own interests, and if he or she does not, then an y remedies 
awarded will be reduced. 
[ 1993] 2 ERNZ 272 . 
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In Macadam v Port Nelson (no 2;1 52 Chief Judge Goddard said, by way 
of an example, that an award of one third of wages lost reflects a 
finding that the employee has been twice as culpable as the employer 
in causing the personal grievance, but he stressed: 
I would not wish to give the impression that the matter of apportionment 
called for by section 40 and 41 involves some highly technical question or 
some mechanical process or anything other than the application of common sense 
to a given factual question. 
The notion of "common sense" and the broad principles to be applied 
by the Tribunal were set out in the English case Stapeley v Gypsum 
Mines ud153 : 
The question must be determined by applying common sense to the facts of each 
particular case ..... A court must deal broadly with the problem of 
apportionment, and in considering what is just and equitable, must have regard 
to the blameworthiness of each party, but the claimant's share in the 
responsibility for the damage cannot, I think, be assessed without considering 
the relative importance of his acts in causing the damage apart from his 
blameworthiness. 
In Paykel v Morton154 Judge Colgan commented that a reduction of 25% 
made pursuant to s 40(2) was a "significant" reduction, and in 
Dona 7 dson and Youngman (t/a the Law Courts Hate 7) v Dickson155 Judge 
Goddard said that it should be very "rare" for the Tribunal to find 
that an employee's contribution has been in the order of 50% or even 
greater. He added that in most cases where an employee has 
contributed to the grievance to the order of 75%, the difference 
between 75% and 100% (which would mean no award at all) was 
imperceptible to the naked eye, even to a trained and experienced 
one. 
These value judgements as to what is a "significant" reduction and 
which reductions should be "rare" are not of much help, and although 
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one would expect similar culpability to receive a similar reduction, 
case law does not reflect a consistent approach . 156 
The following examples illustrate the fact that the Employment 
Tribunal and Court have not been consistent in their decisions: 
(a) In Finsec v AMP Society157 an employee was dismissed 
following an investigation by his employer which showed 
irregularity in the handling of funds which were the property 
of the employer or its clients. Because of the employee's 
contributory conduct by way of failure to properly account for 
the moneys held, the Employment Court refused to grant any 
remedy at all to the employee in view of the degree of fault. 
(b) In Northern Distribution Union v BP Oil Limited 58 the 
Labour Court (exercising transitional jurisdiction under s 186 
of the ECA) found that the employee had been guilty of failing 
to account for a cheque for $3,100 intended to benefit a staff 
social club which he place in his own bank account. The court 
held that although this failure amounted to a breach of 
obligation of trust, it was not an act of serious dishonesty. 
Although the Court found contributory conduct on the part of 
the employee, it ordered reinstatement and the payment of three 
months' lost wages. There was no reduction! 
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal which 
described the Labour Court's view as "rather remarkable" and 
"entirely unjustified 11 • 159 The dismissal was held to be 
procedurally fair and justifiable. The orders made in the 
Labour Court were consequently set aside. 
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(c) In Quest Rapuara (The Career Development and Transition 
Education Service) v Rahui160 the Employment Court reduced 
the remedies for an unjustifiable dismissal by 75% because of 
contributory conduct consisting of an assault on a fellow 
worker. 
(d) In Wilson v PC Direct uJ 61 the reimbursement ordered in 
the case of an unjustified dismissal was reduced by only 10% 
for contributory conduct. An employee was dismissed because his 
employer discovered that he had been aware that his co-worker 
and flatmate had been stealing property from the employer and 
had lied about his knowledge of this. 
( e) In Country Fare (Christchurch) Ltd v Di xey162 the Appeal 
Court held that the apportionment of 25% only for contributory 
fault, consisting of "uncompromisingly and deliberately 
refusing to perform work which he was reasonably and lawfully 
required to undertake by his supervisor" was "manifestly 
deficient" and apportioned it at 60% (i.e. two-thirds reduction 
of compensation). 
(f) In Albany Rest Home Ltd v Somervi77e163 the Appeal Court 
calculated contributory conduct at 33.3% (the Tribunal had 
apportioned it at 16.6%). The employee was the manager of a 
rest home and had been dismissed because of concerns over her 
overall performance and especially a potentially life-
threatening incident when she left a resident unattended and 
unsupervised in a full bath. 
E ls the Imbalance Redressed? 
Unreported, 11 October 1994, Christchurch, CEC 41/94. 
Unreported, 14 March 1994, Auckland, AT 64/94 . 
[1995) 2 ERNZ 372. 
Unreported, 24 April 1995, Christchurch, CEC 15/95. 
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Case law has shown that there is no substantial difference between 
ss 40(2) and 41(3) of the ECA and that causation and blameworthiness 
are requirements for the reduction of remedies. However, the courts 
have not been consistent in their interpretation of these provisions, 
and have a 1 so, in a few cases, reduced remedies in circumstances 
where these two requirements were lacking, by relying on ss 79(2) or 
104(3) of the ECA which allow the Court "to make such decisions or 
orders ... as in equity and good conscience it thinks fit". This shows 
that the statutory requirements are too stri et. With regard to 
proport i ona 1 i ty there has a 1 so not been a consistent approach, and 
for this reason one can only surmise that the decisions vary 
according to how sympathetic the Court feels towards the employee. 
The Court has therefore failed to establish a coherent body of law 
in this area and Anderson et a 1 admit: "The re 1 evant pri nci p 1 es on 
fault are perhaps still not fully formulated 11 • 164 Case law with 
regard to contributory conduct a 1 so shows that there is not much 
relief for the employer who has failed to follow the required 
procedure when carrying out a substantively justified dismissal. 
IX CONCLUSION 
The term "unjustifiable dismissal" has not been defined by either the 
IRA, LRA or ECA, and it has therefore been the courts that have given 
meaning to the term in an ever-increasing volume of case law . 
Although an employer is required to justify a dismissal both 
substantively and procedurally, it is now firmly established that 
procedural fairness alone justifies a finding of unjustifiable 
dismissal. A failure to observe any . one of the requirements of 
procedural fairness will usually lead to a find i ng of unjustifiable 
dismissal. Recent case law, especially, shows that the Court does not 
look at substantive justification and procedural fairness overall, 
but considers the procedure first and holds that if there is any 
defect in this procedure, the employer cannot argue that the 
dismissal was justified substantively. 
Abo v e n 4, 3 19. 
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The present unjustifiable dismissal doctrine is unfair to the 
employer. The procedural rules that have to be followed when 
dismissing an employee are set out in a complicated body of law and 
are hardly accessible to the employer, and although the Court has 
repeatedly stated that the employer's conduct is not to be subjected 
to pedantic scrutiny, case law shows that a 11 too often this is 
exactly what happens. 
Is it fair that only the employer and his handling of the dismissal 
should be on trial, and not the employee's conduct as well? Because 
substance is subordinated to procedure, an employer who slips up with 
procedure pays dearly for his oversight while his employee is 
"rewarded" for his misconduct by means of remedies. Case law shows 
that the treatment of contributory conduct does little to redress the 
imbalance. 
The "mechanisms 11165 which the Court has to deal with the situation 
where a dismissal is procedurally unfair but substantively justified 
are therefore inadequate to produce results that are fair to the 
employer. 
It is to be asked whether this strict approach does not ultimately 
affect the economy and unemployment in general . The intention of 
protecting employment may not have the desired benefit if its effect 
is to make employers wary of taking on new workers. 
See Introduction . 
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